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SUMMARY 
There are 23,500 level crossings in Australia. In these types of environments it is important to understand 
what human factor issues are present and how road users and pedestrians engage with crossings. On-site 
observations were performed over a 2-day period at a 3-track active crossing. This was followed by 52 
interviews with local business owners and members of the public. Data were captured using a manual-
coding scheme for recording and categorising violations. Over 700 separate road user and pedestrian 
violations were recorded, with representations in multiple categories (e.g. going through flashing lights >2s 
after starting flashing; stopping on crossing). Time stamping revealed that the crossing was active for 59% of 
the time in some morning periods. Further, trains could take up to 4-min to arrive following its first activation. 
Road users experienced frustration due to delays caused by the frequency of trains, which increased their 
likelihood of risk-taking. In numerous cases pedestrians placed themselves in risky situations to beat or 
catch the approaching train. Analysis of interview data identified themes associated with congestion, safety, 
and violations. This work offers insight into context specific issues associated with active level crossing 
protection.  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
There is a significant safety risk at railway level 
crossings due to the potential for collision between 
road and rail transport. Although accidents or 
crashes at level crossings are relatively infrequent, 
collision risk is high due to the number of crossings 
in Australia and the magnitude of traffic flowing 
through these. In the ten years from 1st July 2002 
to 30th June 2012, there were 601 reported road 
vehicle collisions at level crossings and 92 
collisions with a person [1]. The financial costs of 
level crossing collisions are high, estimated at 
$32M per year excluding rail operators and 
infrastructure costs [2], while the human cost is 
incalculable. 
There are ~23,500 level crossings in Australia. 
These include active level crossings which are 
typically automatic and have boom barriers, alarm 
bells, flashing lights, and pedestrian gates to 
varying degrees,, and passive crossings, which 
while not automatic are designed to control road 
and pedestrianised walkways with stop and give 
way signage. According to the Independent 
Transport Safety Regulator, approximately 27% of 
collisions between road vehicles and trains 
occurred at active crossings with boom gates 
between 2000 to 2009 – this was higher than at 
any other type of public crossing [3]. However 
when these statistics are adjusted for the amount 
of train and road traffic, crossings with boom gates 
and flashing lights have less accidents or crashes 
than any other type of crossing (ITSR, 2011). 
Additionally, the ITSR research revealed fatalities 
were much less likely to happen at active level 
crossings with boom gates than several other 
types of crossings. The downside to the current 
active level crossing design is the growing 
association with traffic congestion, usually created 
by extended periods of closure times (i.e. boom 
gates are down or lights are flashing). As one may 
expect, this congestion is worst during peak 
periods when both road traffic and the frequency of 
trains increase.	   The ideal solution to these 
problems is grade separation (i.e. constructing an 
over- or underpass), but there may be 
environments in which the cost of grade separation 
cannot be justified.  
Given that active level crossings with boom gates 
have fewer crashes and fatalities per vehicle than 
passive crossings, they are considered to be the 
“gold standard” for safety and security when grade 
separation is not viable, however there may also 
be environments where active protection is not 
   
enough, and where the setting does not justify the 
capital costs of grade separation. The congestion 
and delays associated with level crossings may 
lead to risk-taking behaviour by road users and 
pedestrians, thus it is important to understand what 
human factor issues are present in these types of 
environments and how road users and pedestrians 
engage with the crossing.  
Motorists should, in theory, have a good 
understanding of the rules and regulations relating 
to level crossing use. However, drivers still need to 
make decisions and this rests on the driver’s 
judgment, which allows for human error. Human 
error is problematic at crossings: police statistics 
show that up to 95% of collisions at railway level 
crossings are caused by motorists’ poor 
performance [4]. According to Reason [5], poor 
performance (that may result in an accident/crash) 
occurs because of errors, or violations. 
Specifically, errors include skill-based attentional 
slips, lapses of memory, and mistakes relating to 
rules or knowledge, all of which can have 
undesired consequences. Violations are actions (or 
lack thereof) that violate rules and regulations, 
whether intentional or unintentional. For example, 
someone speeding is violating rules and 
regulations, regardless of whether they are aware 
that they are speeding or not. Intent is separate 
from violations: an individual who deliberately 
violates a rule or regulation does not usually have 
any intent to cause harm or any other negative 
consequence. For example, a driver who causes a 
collision at a level crossing because they violated 
the rules and regulations is unlikely to have done 
this with the intent to cause an accident or a crash. 
Given human error and violations can lead to 
accidents, interventions that reduce errors and 
violations through behaviour change are important 
for minimising collisions at level crossings.  
Understanding the reasons for the behaviour of 
road and level crossing users is a vital element in 
developing interventions aimed at modifying 
behaviour to improve safety. Increasing the 
understanding of the behaviour of users at this 
crossing is not only important for evaluating and 
parameterising the data from the on-site 
observation study, but also to inform interventions 
that modify the behaviour of motorists and 
therefore reduce errors and violations. 
1.1 Aims and objectives 
The general study aim was to investigate the 
interactions of road users and pedestrians at a 
very dynamic rail level crossing in regional Victoria, 
Australia. While serving as an active crossing for 
many decades, the level crossing involved in the 
study was recently identified for upgrade (i.e. grade 
separation), evidently providing an ideal ground for 
research. The objective of the study was to identify 
substantive human factors associated with safety 
at the location, and develop a good understanding 
of the existing level crossing user culture. 
2. THE LEVEL CROSSING SITE 
The rail level crossing selected for study was the 
Aviation Road level crossing. This was an active 
level crossing in a rural town ~21km from the 
centre of Melbourne. It was a MTM/ARTC level 
crossing on the Newport to Werribee line located 
on Aviation Road, Laverton. The level crossing 
was located directly beside a train station (Aircraft 
Station) and a Royal Australian Airforce (RAAF) 
base, and designed with a single pedestrian maze 
on the west-side to gain access to and from the 
RAAF base, station and small local business 
district. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Googlemap aerial view (top panel), 
and street views (middle, bottom panel) of 
Aviation Road rail level crossing. 
The level crossing had 3-tracks with a maximum 
line speed of 130km/hour and road speed of 50 
km/h. Based on data from the Australian Level 
   
Crossing Assessment Model, the average train 
traffic was 289 trains per day, and the average 
road traffic was 16,456 vehicles per day (as at 
5/2/2013; note that these were the latest available 
data and recent changes such as timetabling and 
reduction of train traffic may have some impact). 
The road servicing the level crossing was divided 
into two lanes and has roundabouts situated in 
both directions (~20m away on either side of the 
crossing). Stopping on the crossing was not 
permitted and yellow box marking/cross hatching 
was present on the crossing for southbound traffic 
to clearly indicate this though such marking was 
not present for northbound traffic. Yellow marking 
was also present at the southern roundabout, but 
not at the northern roundabout.  
The Aviation Road level crossing is representative 
of complex level crossings located in metropolitan 
areas around Australia where congestion and 
safety are major issues. A Hobson’s Bay Council 
survey found that the level crossing was activated 
(boom gates down) for approximately two thirds of 
the morning and afternoon peak hours [6]. Various 
issues at the level crossing have already been 
recognised such that it has been ranked as the 16th 
highest risk by ALCAM and Victoria have added it 
to the list of ‘marked for removal’ crossings [7]. 
3. METHODS 
A research approach incorporating on-site 
observations and interviews was used in this study. 
Figure 1 provides an overview of the methods and 
activities undertaken in each stage.  
 
Figure 2: Overview of methods 
Violations are a manifestation of risk-taking and for 
the field observations of the site, characterised 
level crossing user behaviour. On-site observations 
were performed over a 2-day period by two 
researchers on 3rd and 4th December 2014. Data 
were collected besides the crossing at both peak 
(7-9am; 4.30-6.30pm) and off-peak (9.30am-
4:00pm) time-periods. Both researchers observed 
during peak times, and observations during off-
peak were undertaken in shifts. Observational data 
were captured using a manual-coding scheme for 
recording and categorising violations. This was 
developed specifically for the study, and categories 
included: going through the crossing after it had 
been activated; going before the barriers had fully 
risen and the lights had stopped flashing; going 
around lowered barriers; and stopping or queuing 
over the level crossing when it was inactive. The 
data capture scheme also distinguished between 
road users and pedestrians that were the first to 
violate and included a time stamp of every time the 
level crossing was active. The timing thresholds 
were assessed subjectively. Each violation was 
time-stamped. 
A total of 52 semi-structured interviews were 
undertaken. Employees of businesses were 
approached in their workplace and interviews 
conducted on-the-spot when convenient or 
appointments were made to return for an interview. 
Train commuters were recruited opportunistically 
and randomly at the train station or on the path 
leading to the train station. Due to reduced staffing 
at the local police station, it was not possible to 
arrange interviews in-situ and so interviews were 
organised via telephone. As the police officers 
were interviewed over the phone, recording was 
not possible. In these cases, detailed notes were 
taken, including key quotes 
Data were transcribed and subject to three stages 
of qualitative data analysis. The first identified units 
of information that addressed the research aims, 
and in the second, these units were organised into 
categories. In the third, these were classified into 
meaningful subcategories derived from the road 
safety context. Thematic analysis of the data was 
then carried out using NVivo (QSR Ver.10) 
software for qualitative data analysis [8, 9]. 
The study met the approval of CQUniversity 
Human Research Ethics Committee, approval 
number: H15/05-077. 
4. RESULTS 
4.1 On-site observations  
More than 700 separate road user and pedestrian 
violations were recorded over the 2-day period. 
Table 1 shows the mean frequency count of the 
violation categories recorded by the researchers.  
A total of 198 vehicles were stopped on the level 
crossing (91 peak; 107 off-peak) over the course of 
the observations. Figure 3 shows a moment where 
cars were stopped on the level crossing in the 
southbound direction after the level crossing had 
activated. Given that a roundabout was situated on 
either side of the crossing, there was space for 
only 3-to-4 vehicles to queue for a vehicle to stop 
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and give way to traffic. It was therefore a common 
practice for cars to queue and stop over the 
crossings regardless of the time of day.  
Category 
Peak Off-peak 
Total 
Road1 PED2 Total Road1  PED2 Total 
Going through flashing lights (<2s 
after flashing starts) 10 3 13 8 - 8 21 
Going through flashing lights (>2s 
after flashing starts) 26 41 66 11 13 24 90 
Entering crossing before flashing 
lights have stopped flashing / booms 
have completely risen 
18 1 19 35 1 36 55 
Stopped on level crossing 91 - 91 107 - 107 198 
Yellow box/hatching violation 66 - 66 105 - 105 171 
Going around lowered boom gates 1 - 1 - - - 1 
Going around/above No Entry gate - 56 56 - 15 15 71 
Cutting across the road 71 - 71 24 - 24 95 
Bike riders not dismounting and 
going through pedestrian gates - 1 1 - 2 2 3 
Totals 283 102 384 290 31 321 705 
1Violations on road mainly comprising road-users (e.g., cars, buses, motorcycles) and crossing pedestrians  
2Violations on the pedestrianised areas, mainly comprising pedestrians but also cyclists 
Table 1: Mean frequency count of road-user and pedestrian violations during peak and off-peak 
hours at Aviation Road Level Crossing over a 2-day period 
A large number of flashing light violations was 
observed. While all were technical unsafe, a third 
of these were carried out within 2s of activation 
with limited opportunity for drivers to stop their 
vehicle safely for most of the time. For this reason 
they are more appropriately described as unsafe 
acts than they are a violation, which was the case 
when going through >2s. During peak hours, 26 
vehicles were recorded to traverse the activated 
level crossing after more than 2s of activation and 
11 vehicles in off-peak. A total of 53 road-users (18 
peak; 35 off-peak) were observed entering the 
level crossing before the lights had stopped 
flashing, many before the gates were completely 
raised.  
The largest concentration of violation types for 
pedestrians was going through flashing lights more 
than 2s after activation and via the no entry gates 
(Figure 3). Many pedestrians also jaywalked under 
side rails and around the active boom gates. 
Pedestrians were also observed cutting across the 
road and the railway to and from the expanse of 
space in the Southeastern area. The public had 
taken to using this space to park cars. For this 
reason, these violations were concentrated during 
the morning and afternoon peak periods and 
performed mainly by commuters catching trains to 
and from the city. This behaviour occurred in all 
types of conditions, including high road traffic, 
walking alongside a train, in groups, and so on. 
Generally speaking, the public at this level crossing 
were not averse to putting themselves at risk in 
order to beat or catch an approaching train.  
Time stamping of level crossing activation and 
deactivation revealed that it was closed 11.3 times 
per hour during the morning peak, 8.3 times per 
hour during off-peak times, and 10.5 times per 
hour during the early afternoon peak. There was a 
large variability in the closure times, largely from 
trains travelling at different speeds. Multiple trains 
often traversed the crossing at similar times and an 
average of 1.3 trains traversing the crossing per 
closure. During the morning peak period, the level 
crossing was closed for 1h 8 min out of a 2h 
observation window. The remainder of the day, the 
level crossing was closed 20.5 min per hour. 
During the early afternoon peak, the level crossing 
was closed 24 min per hour. Consequently, the 
level crossing was closed for 59% of the time 
during morning peak hours, and 35% of the time 
during the off-peak and early afternoon peak. 
The level crossing was activated at a set distance 
and did not account for whether the train would 
stop at the station. For this reason, platform work 
for non-express metropolitan services had the 
effect of activating the level crossing for long 
periods; for one train traversal, the level crossing 
was closed for ~2 min at a time (ranging from 1-to-
4 min). The maximum observed number of trains 
   
traversing the crossing in the same closure was 3 
trains, during which the crossing was closed for up 
to 6 minutes.  
 
 
 
Figure 3: Vehicle failed to stop on red flashing 
light/not clear of tracks (top-panel); car 
entering crossing after lights begin flashing 
(middle-panel); cars parked illegally in 
makeshift car park (bottom-panel). 
4.2 Interviews 
During interviews, participants were asked to 
describe Aviation Road Level Crossing in a single 
word. The majority of responses reflected negative 
thoughts of the crossing as shown in the word 
cloud in Figure 4.	   Other unsolicited descriptions 
included “hectic,” “crazy,” “stupid,” “ridiculous,” 
“confusing.” The most commonly expressed feeling 
relating to the crossing was frustration: “In the big 
scheme of things ten minutes doesn’t sound like 
much but it is very frustrating sitting there not 
moving, waiting for a train, and you can’t see any 
trains in either direction” [Ppt_047]. 
Analysis of interview data identified several themes 
including congestion, safety, and violations. The 
following sections provide an account of these 
themes, with excerpts and further photos from data 
to support statements were relevant. 
4.2.1 Congestion Issues 
By and far the most common complaint from 
interviewees was the level of congestion in 
and around the crossing, which was felt to 
cause significant delays, especially during 
peak periods. Traffic congestion in morning 
peak hours reportedly spanned ~2 kilometres 
and often caused hold-ups on the nearby 
freeway with the exit ramp being full: “They’re 
in the exit ramp to the point they’re actually 
stopped on the freeway; they’ve got nowhere 
to go […] it’s massive.” [Ppt_043]. 
Almost all interviewees who used the crossing 
as motorists stated that they rarely travelled 
through the crossing without having to stop 
and when using it during peak times, always 
experienced long delays. The major cause of 
widespread congestion was considered to be 
the length of time that the crossing was 
activated. This was also shown in the analysis 
of on-site observational data. Interviewees 
noted that it was not unusual for the time 
between activation of the crossing and arrival 
of a train to be up to 3 min. Added to this, the 
frequency of train activity resulted in barriers 
remaining lowered for extended periods of 
time, especially during the morning peak, 
“You can sit there and you have three or four 
trains come through and you’re just sitting 
there, sitting there, sitting there. It is just so 
frustrating” [Ppt_017]. 
The view that train scheduling and frequency 
were causes for congestion was unanimous. 
In particular, interviewees referred to the lag 
between activation of the crossing and the 
arrival of a train: “I just find it strange that the 
barriers will be down for, I’ve never timed it 
but it feels like a good 2 or 3 min before a 
train arrives” [Ppt_046]. 
The infrastructure and location of various road 
elements in relation to each other were also 
considered to be a major cause of congestion: 
“…I just think it’s in a really bad location. And 
particularly the roundabouts and things near 
it” [Ppt_042]. The proximity of the RAAF base 
to the crossing was felt to be a major 
contributor for congestion, and having 
roundabouts either side of the crossing was 
considered to exacerbate the problem. 
Pedestrian access to the RAAF base 
increased congestion because drivers waited 
for pedestrians to cross when they entered 
the base. Pedestrians and car drivers were 
also required to show their passes at the 
security gate, which increased build up of 
traffic. Although this may not have a huge 
   
impact on congestion, it was believed to be 
part of a bigger problem. 
 
Figure 4: Word cloud showing one-word 
descriptions of Aviation Road level crossing. 
Words that appear more frequently in the text 
are given greater prominence. 
4.2.2 Safety at the Level Crossing 
Safety of all level crossing users was a major 
concern for interviewees, and risk-taking was 
considered to be elevated as a result of 
frustrations from motorists, lack of parking, 
and lack of facilities to assist pedestrians 
moving around. The collision risk between 
trains and vehicles at the crossing was 
considered to have very high potential, “I’ve 
never seen any, you know, trains hit vehicles 
or anything at that particular crossing but you 
know it’s almost just a matter of time” 
[Ppt_044]. 
The accident and crash potential at the 
crossing was also considered to be high as a 
result of motorists being in the wrong lane 
from the direction they needed to go. This was 
thought to be deliberate, for example 
motorists driving in the wrong lane and then 
“pushing” their way into the correct lane in 
front of other vehicles. However, interviewees 
also stated that it was often caused by unclear 
lane markings and lack of signage on the 
approach to the roundabouts and crossing 
that led to confusion and uncertainty. People 
who were unfamiliar with the area were 
particularly at risk of being in the wrong lane. 
The infrastructure itself was thought to be a 
major cause of safety risks, especially the 
proximity of the two roundabouts and rail 
crossing. In particular, insufficient and poorly 
located car parking was thought to increase 
danger for train commuters. A car park 
located on the Southwestern side of the 
crossing was next to the train station such that 
once parked, commuters could walk along a 
path to access the station without having to 
cross the road. However, the car park was 
said to be always full early in the morning, 
such that commuters had taken to park their 
cars in the vacant block of land on the 
opposite side of the road and walked to the 
station. This was previously seen during the 
on-site observations, and was actually illegal. 
The route from the land to the station did not 
include pedestrian crossings that allowed 
commuters to traverse to and from the train 
station safely, or easily. The safest option 
would be to cross three roads next to the 
southern roundabout (only one of which had 
pedestrian lights and crossing) and then walk 
along the path to the station. Although some 
commuters said they did this, most elected to 
weave between cars on the road (when the 
barriers were lowered) or walked along the 
train tracks, regardless of whether a train was 
present (see Figure 5). When pedestrians 
weaved between cars to cross the road, they 
then had to climb over or through a railing on 
the other side and have been seen to slip or 
fall when doing so (noted by one interviewee). 
 
Figure 5: Pedestrian weaving through active 
crossing. 
An indirect but still important element of 
safety, as noted by a few interviewees 
including the police officers, was that the 
congestion and environment around the 
crossing prevented emergency vehicles from 
traversing the crossing and so they often had 
to take a long detour. 
4.2.3 Level Crossing User Violations 
Almost all interviewees reported seeing 
violations committed frequently by motorists, 
cyclists, and pedestrians, with some admitting 
that they committed violations themselves.  
A risky action committed by motorists was to 
move off after the barriers were raised but 
while the lights were still flashing. Possible 
reasons given included frustration from having 
to wait for a long time to get through the 
crossing, and not understanding the rules (i.e. 
that a vehicle should not enter the crossing 
while the lights are flashing). This behaviour 
was not considered unsafe by some 
interviewees, although one stated that drivers 
   
cannot know that the barriers will not lower 
again immediately after rising. 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Pedestrian bypassing gate via 
emergency exit gate (top-panel); pedestrian 
bypassing gate and walking across track with 
approaching train in close proximity (middle-
panel); cyclist going under boom gates as it is 
rising (bottom-panel). 
Another common violation was failing to stop 
when the lights had begun to flash just before 
the barriers were lowered. This was observed 
in the first stage of the study (see Figure 3). 
The possible reason given included frustration 
due to delays caused by frequency of trains, 
which thereby increased the likelihood of risk-
taking. Some drivers admitted to committing 
this violation themselves, e.g. “…I’m the first 
car there and I think ‘I know that if I don’t go 
through now I’m going to be sitting here for 
sometimes 25 minutes. It can take that long. 
I’ve counted. I think the most I’ve seen is 
seven trains come through” [Ppt_046]. 
Interviewees said that they understood road 
rules such as not stopping on hatchings at the 
roundabout and crossing, not stopping their 
vehicle on the tracks or on the roundabouts, 
and ensuring they used the correct lane for 
the direction they wished to go. However they 
argued that it was unavoidable at times and 
were often caught out by the actions of other 
road users. One police officer stated that 
although stopping on the roundabout was a 
violation, he would not personally issue a fine 
to a motorist because it is unavoidable at 
times. 
Violations committed by pedestrians occurred 
throughout the day but especially during peak 
times. When the crossing was activated, a 
gate closed across the pedestrian pathway 
next to the track along which the train 
approached, thereby preventing pedestrians 
from walking across the track. An emergency 
exit gate was available in case pedestrians 
were caught on the track when the pedestrian 
gate closed. However, it was very common for 
pedestrians to routinely use the emergency 
exit gate to bypass the pedestrian gate (see 
Figure 6 – top panel). Several interviewees 
stated that they committed this violation but 
checked for police or other authorities before 
doing so. It was also noted that once one 
person bypassed the pedestrian gates, a lot of 
other people do so too, “They’re like 
lemmings” [Ppt_033]. This behaviour was 
seen during the observational studies, where 
it happened despite the presence of two 
researchers with hi-visibility jackets and 
clipboards. During interviews, several people 
commented that they could judge for 
themselves whether it was safe to cross but it 
is apparent that this is not always the case, as 
demonstrated in Figure 6 – middle panel. 
Interviewees reported that motorists had on 
occasion committed violations by driving 
around lowered boom gates. Although they 
indicated that this had occurred on occasions 
when the boom gates had only just been 
lowered, the majority of these violations 
occurred when the crossing had been 
activated for an extended period of time 
(several minutes according to interviewees) 
without any trains arriving at the crossing. It 
had also occurred on occasions when the 
crossing was believed to be faulty and one 
interviewee stated that the crossing had been 
sabotaged several times by children such that 
the barriers would not rise. An extreme 
example of a violation reported by a police 
officer was an incident in which a group of 
people were holding up the barrier while 
someone drove under it. 
   
Some cyclists also used the pathway despite 
a sign indicating that cyclists are not allowed 
to do so. Although this is a violation, one 
interviewee stated that he used the pathway 
because it was much safer than the road, 
especially the roundabout because “cars don’t 
see bicycles” [Ppt_030]. Almost all cyclists on 
the road went through the level crossing 
immediately as the barrier started to rise (see 
Figure 6 – bottom panel). 
A potentially serious safety hazard caused by 
drivers was driving down the wrong side of 
Maher Road (next to the RAAF base) when 
heading towards the RAAF base. During peak 
times when there was a lot of congestion, 
some drivers said they would overtake the 
cars waiting at the crossing. To do so, they 
travelled along the right-hand side of the road, 
which according to one of the police officers 
interviewed, was not a violation as they were 
overtaking safely. However the drivers then 
usually had to go the wrong way around the 
roundabout, which was a violation. As one 
interviewee pointed out, “It is also a problem 
for cars coming out of the base because if 
they’re going to come out of the base and turn 
left, that’s something they’ve not predicted” 
[Ppt_050]. 
5. DISCUSSION 
The most common problem raised by motorists 
who use the level crossing was congestion and this 
was generally believed to be due to two main 
factors: (1) the significant increase in population in 
and around the area, and (2) the infrastructure and 
environment of the crossing surrounding area, i.e. 
a roundabout either side of the crossing and the 
location of the RAAF base access point. Another 
major concern was safety, which related mostly to 
the behaviour of pedestrians and the risk of a 
vehicle being caught on the tracks and being hit by 
a train.  
There were two main destinations for motorists that 
used the Aviation Road level crossing – the RAAF 
base and the freeway. Most motorists driving from 
to the Laverton RAAF base or the freeway had to 
travel through the southern roundabout. Most of 
the approach to the southern roundabout from 
Point Cook Road is single lane and so the traffic 
build-up of motorists waiting to turn left at the 
roundabout towards the RAAF base caused delays 
for those wanting to turn right at the roundabout to 
access the freeway. Thus time delays caused by 
the crossing had far-reaching effects.  
During the on-site observations, a large number of 
unsafe acts were recorded where road users drove 
through the level crossing less than 2s after the 
lights first started flashing. As there is no warning 
or caution (i.e. yellow) signal at rail level crossings, 
this is a necessary “period of grace” as drivers 
cannot react and stop instantaneously. It may be 
argued that 2s is a very short period to allow in the 
absence of cautionary signals, however the road 
speed at the level crossing is low. Based on the 
location of the roundabouts, build up of congestion, 
increase in frustration and motivation to avoid 
further delays, this period of grace was effectively 
exploited by road users an increased risk taking, 
as evidence by the number violations beyond the 
2s period.   
The findings show that multiple trains often 
traversed the crossing at similar times with an 
average of 1.3 per closure. However these times 
did not appear to be synchronised, and resulted in 
the level crossing being closed over extended 
periods. This was because the gap between trains 
was not sufficient to reopen the gates and because 
the train took a long time to arrive in the first place. 
Thus when the crossing was open, many motorists 
had habituated to simply entering it in the 
expectation that they would make it across before 
the next train arrived in an attempt to avoid being 
held up. 
Risk-taking by pedestrians was observed to be 
frequent and highly dangerous at times, not only in 
terms of weaving between stationary cars but also 
crossing the road while vehicle traffic was moving, 
and walking along or standing next to the track 
even when trains were oncoming. Bypassing the 
pedestrian gate was also very common and people 
often engaged in this behaviour when a train was 
approaching. During interviews, several people 
who admitted bypassing the pedestrian gate 
argued that they were capable of making their own 
decisions about whether it was safe to cross. 
Taken together, the findings of the study showed 
that the peculiarities associated with the context of 
the Aviation Road rail level crossing created a 
specific type of culture, and conditions that primed 
chronic road congestion issues, lengthy waiting 
times and a likelihood of transgressions/violations 
by all types of road user. 
5.1 Limitations and future study 
On-site observations would have benefited from 
more days of observing on-site. Although the two 
reporters communicated with on another to verify 
checks during peak periods, an inter-coder 
reliability process should be applied to validate 
consistency of data collection during off-peak 
periods. 
The recruitment process for the RAAF personnel 
interviews was such that the people most likely to 
volunteer for the study were people who had 
negative opinions of the level crossing. However 
the opinions expressed by those participants were 
similar to those expressed by the randomly 
   
selected train commuters and business 
owners/workers. It may in fact have been difficult to 
find anyone who regularly needed to access the 
RAAF base that had a more positive opinion of the 
level crossing. 
Not all interviewees were willing or able to be voice 
recorded due to the limited time available. Thus 
accounts of their opinions were not recorded 
verbatim. However detailed notes were taken by 
the researcher and some important statements 
written down verbatim at the time of the interview. 
The next phase of this research will be to 
supplement the existing data with a quantitative 
study to gain less nuanced data and a much larger 
representation from level crossing users. Given the 
rich level of detail collection about violations and 
the varied understanding and adherence to rules 
and regulations, this should consider this aspect of 
the user behaviour. 
6. CONCLUSION 
This study offers important insight into context 
specific issues associated with active level 
crossing protection. The level crossing reviewed 
was scheduled for grade separation during the 
study, making the case particularly valuable in 
terms of the argument for upgrading problematic 
level crossings, and its broader generalisabilty. 
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